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Abstract
Street homelessness policies often provoke great intensity of feeling, especially when they include
elements of force. This paper considers the moral case stakeholders present for and against
enforcement in street homelessness policies via a series of philosophically informed normative
‘lenses’, including paternalist, utilitarian, rights-based, contractualist, mutualist and social justice
perspectives. Drawing on in-depth qualitative research in six UK cities, it highlights the disparity
between the condemnatory portrayals of enforcement dominant in academic and media dis-
courses, and the more complex and/or ambivalent views held by practitioners and homeless peo-
ple ‘on the ground’. It concludes that an analytical framework that pays systematic attention to
this span of normative lenses can facilitate more constructive, even if still ‘difficult’, conversations
about policy interventions in this exceptionally sensitive area.
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Introduction
Street homelessness policies can provoke
great intensity of feeling (Clifford and
Piston, 2017), especially when they involve
enforcement (Johnsen et al., 2018), that is,
measures which force homeless people to
vacate public space and/or desist from beg-
ging or street drinking (Coulon et al., 2015;
Evangelista, 2013; Johnsen and Fitzpatrick,
2010; Pennay et al., 2014). The use of legal
ordinances to prohibit (or ‘criminalise’) such
activities (Doherty et al., 2008) and/or the
increased use of ‘hostile’ or ‘defensive’ archi-
tecture which renders public spaces inacces-
sible to homeless people (Petty, 2016) have
garnered critique across the Global North.
Perhaps most controversially, the legislative
and constitutional developments in Hungary
permitting the penalisation of rough sleeping
(Udvarhelyi, 2014) prompted challenge
from United Nations Special Rapporteurs
on human rights grounds (Adams, 2014).
In the USA the National Law Centre on
Homelessness and Poverty has called for the
abandonment of punitive measures that tar-
get street homeless people on the grounds
that ‘these laws are ineffective, expensive
and often violate homeless persons’ civil and
human rights’ (National Law Center on
Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP), 2014:
12). The European Federation of National
Organisations Working with the Homeless
(2012: 78) has similarly argued that what
they view as a criminalisation agenda raises
‘serious questions about respect for human
rights and dignity’.
Urban scholars have intervened energeti-
cally in such debates, most famously
employing the ‘revanchist’ thesis (Smith,
1996) in response to concerns about the rise
in anti-homeless legislation. Revanchists
condemn the use of enforcement as a venge-
ful tendency for urban elites to displace and
exclude homeless people and other disadvan-
taged groups (Arapoglou, 2004; Mitchell,
1997, 2018). Some academic commentaries
also denounce enforcement as a denial of
homeless people’s ‘right to the city’ (Duff,
2017; Mitchell and Heynen, 2009) and call
for the protection of what Hennigan and
Speer (2019: 918) describe as the ‘pitiful right
to stay put on the street (away from services
and out of jail)’. Whilst a growing number
of scholars have suggested that the so-called
‘punitive turn’ in street homelessness policy
has not been as one-dimensional or severe as
the revanchist thesis presupposes (Clarke
and Parsell, 2018; DeVerteuil et al., 2009;
Stuart, 2014), and others have indicated
that, in certain circumstances, forceful
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interventions can disrupt patterns of harmful
behaviours to the benefit of those targeted
(Johnsen and Fitzpatrick, 2010), the weight
of urban scholarship still tends to be
strongly condemnatory. Some contributors
have gone so far as to characterise enforce-
ment interventions as ‘genocidal’ attempts to
‘eradicate’, ‘annihilate’ or ‘exterminate’
street homeless people (e.g. Amster, 2003;
Mitchell, 1997). Similar sentiments can be
found in mainstream media coverage, with
the installation of studs (‘homeless spikes’)
to prevent rough sleepers from bedding
down in a number of UK cities, for example,
described as ‘disgusting’ (Logan, 2014), ‘bru-
tal’ (Borromeo, 2015), ‘cruel’ (Andreou,
2015) and ‘inhumane’ (Wells, 2015).
In amongst all this noise and fury, how-
ever, little space has been devoted to home-
less people’s views on these issues, nor to the
perspectives of frontline workers and other
stakeholders who are closest to the reality of
enforcement measures ‘on the ground’.1
Arguably, a form of ‘moral grandstanding’
has taken root, with emotive rhetoric (Tosi
and Warmke, 2016) taking the place of close
attention to the views of those directly
affected. Moral objections to enforcement
are often taken to be self-evident in this liter-
ature, and the egregious consequences of
enforcement for street homeless people
assumed rather than evidenced.
This paper attempts to go some way to
redressing this imbalance by foregrounding
the measured, complex and, very often,
ambivalent normative stances on enforce-
ment taken by homeless people and other
stakeholders with day-to-day familiarity
with these issues. It starts from the premise
that good scholarship requires systematic
reflection on one’s own ethical intuitions,
however powerfully felt (Singer, 2005), and
that moral and political philosophy can help
structure and guide this ethical endeavour
by offering both transparent and robust
ways of thinking about our responsibilities
and obligations to each other (Wolff, 2012).2
‘Value pluralist’ strands of analytic philoso-
phy (Berlin, 1969; Ignatieff, 2000; Wolf,
1992) supply particularly relevant tools to
help navigate this otherwise treacherous
moral landscape (Harris, 2010). This plural-
ist tradition recognises the multiplicity of
values that underpin the ‘moral foundations’
people draw upon in making ethical sense of
the world around them (Haidt and Graham,
2007), and the interdependence of normative
reasoning and empirical evidence in settling
moral questions (Miller, 1999).
Inspired by this democratically and
empirically grounded philosophical tradi-
tion, we examine the ‘moral repertoires’
drawn upon by homeless people and other
relevant stakeholders in considering the
ethics of enforcement. The analysis reveals
six key normative ‘lenses’ that have shaped
both opposition to and support for enforce-
ment measures: paternalist, utilitarian,
rights-based, contractualist, mutualist and
social justice perspectives (see also Deacon,
2004). The following section provides details
regarding the context and methods of the
study, and subsequent sections discuss each
of the moral repertoires identified. The paper
ends by reflecting on the broader ethical and
policy implications of these analyses, arguing
that there is a stark disparity between the
condemnatory portrayals of enforcement
dominant in academic and media discourses,
and the more complex and/or ambivalent
views held by stakeholders ‘on the ground’.
A core contention is that a detailed under-
standing of the full spectrum of ethical rea-
soning ‘in play’ on the part of those closest
to enforcement practice will help facilitate a
more constructive, and less polarising, public
discourse.
Context and methods
The UK is a particularly apposite context
within which to consider these issues given
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that the justifiability or otherwise of enforce-
ment has been a subject of debate since the
late 1990s, especially in England where force
has been most widely pursued in responses
to rough sleeping and associated ‘proble-
matic street culture’ (Johnsen et al., 2014).
Insights from the UK nevertheless have clear
relevance to the broad range of developed
countries within which analogous measures
have been used or are being contemplated,
including in the USA, Canada, Australasia
and many parts of Europe. Specifically,
England has witnessed a longstanding and,
at times, bitter debate on the use of vagrancy
legislation to arrest or fine people begging or
sleeping rough, the deployment of Dispersal
Orders to disband groups of street homeless
people, or ‘Anti-Social Behaviour Orders’
(ASBOs) and successor measures to ban
them from specified areas or activities
(Johnsen and Fitzpatrick, 2010; Sanders and
Albanese, 2017). Likewise, attempts to
‘design out’ street culture from public spaces
via defensive architecture have come in for
heavy criticism (Borromeo, 2015). It must be
emphasised, however, that whilst experience
of designing out is widespread, legal penal-
ties (arrest, fines, imprisonment) affect a
very small minority of rough sleepers in
England, and the most severe of these only
when an individual’s actions are having a
clear detrimental impact on others (Sanders
and Albanese, 2017).
The empirical data drawn upon is derived
from a major UK-based study assessing the
efficacy and ethicality of policy interventions
containing elements of behavioural condi-
tionality.3 The study encompassed a review
of academic, policy/campaigning and media
accounts of enforcement in street homeless-
ness policy, together with interviews and
focus groups with a subset of individuals
participating in the five-year programme of
research. National-level interviews were con-
ducted with government policy-makers and
campaigning/service provider agencies in the
homelessness sector (n = 9), and local focus
groups were undertaken with frontline prac-
titioners involved in street outreach, emer-
gency accommodation and community
safety (n = 6, involving a total of n = 27
individuals). Interviews were also conducted
with people with experience of enforcement
interventions (n = 55), 25 of whom were re-
interviewed one year later and 16 once more
two years after initial interview.
Homeless interviewees with direct experi-
ence of enforcement interventions were pur-
posively sampled from a range of support
agencies in six cities across England and
Scotland (Bristol, Edinburgh, Glasgow,
London, Peterborough and Sheffield). They
included 40 men and 15 women, the major-
ity (n = 39) of whom were aged 25–29
years, with three aged 18–24, 12 aged 50–64
and one over 65 (one participant did not
specify their age). Practitioner focus groups
were held in a subset of the same agencies,
with participants purposively sampled for
their direct experience of working with indi-
viduals and in neighbourhoods affected by
enforcement interventions. Key informants
were purposively sampled on the basis of
their involvement in street homelessness pol-
icy development, and/or their public endor-
sement of or opposition to enforcement
initiatives at the national level. Verbatim
transcripts were analysed thematically with
the aid of qualitative data analysis software
and framework analysis employed to struc-
ture analysis of longitudinal interview data.
Normative frameworks
The following subsections focus on six norma-
tive lenses illuminating the moral repertoires
drawn upon by stakeholders in thinking about
enforcement-based responses to street home-
lessness. These were identified and specified
via an iterative dialogue between: (a) a concep-
tual mapping of key philosophical theories
with long pedigrees in the ethical assessment of
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public policy decisions (Deacon, 2004; Watts
and Fitzpatrick, 2018), and (b) thematic inter-
rogation of the empirical data described above.
Specifically, empirical data are used here to
explore how each of these influential schools of
thought are deployed by those working in the
homelessness sector or with direct experience
of enforcement.
Paternalism
The classic justification of enforcement mea-
sures, in the UK at least, is the claim that
these measures are in the best interests of
street homeless people themselves. Such
‘paternalistic’ accounts are motivated, or
presented as motivated, by ‘a beneficent con-
cern for [the] welfare [of those targeted]’
(Scoccia, 2008: 352). Whilst paternalistic
motivations for public policy are often deni-
grated by commentators of both the Left
and Right, recent scholarship has made the
case for ‘justifiable paternalism’ which seeks
to protect very vulnerable people from the
negative consequences of their own decision-
making (Parsell and Marston, 2016; see also
Gregory, 2015; Watts et al., 2018).
Paternalistic concerns for the welfare of
street homeless people were often central to
the rationale for enforcement given by cen-
tral and local government representatives
interviewed and were also heavily drawn upon
by those support providers who favoured the
use of enforcement in certain circumstances.
These interviewees emphasised the risks associ-
ated with street homelessness, citing evidence
regarding susceptibility to extreme ill health,
physical assault and/or premature death (see
Morrison, 2009; O’Connell, 2005; Sanders and
Albanese, 2016):
These are people who are highly traumatised
by things in their background . Obviously
we know all of the stats around life expectancy
being 47 for men, 42 for women, nine times
more likely to commit suicide, I think 16 times
more likely to be the victim of a violent
assault. I can’t with a clean conscience say that
I’m okay with that . They need the support
to find the exit and sometimes they need
nudge mechanisms to do that. (Senior repre-
sentative, voluntary sector organisation)
Drawing upon personal experience, a num-
ber of the homeless people, service providers
and other stakeholders argued that the
threat or use of force can generate a ‘win-
dow of opportunity’ enabling service provi-
ders to engage so-called ‘service resistant’
individuals:
If it wasn’t for them [the police], I wouldn’t be
sitting here . I was going to drink myself to
death.What’s the point? I might as well just
die happy . I didn’t really want any help in
that sense . If it hadn’t been for those police
saying. ‘No you can’t sleep here. there’s a
hostel down the road’, I probably . would
have been dead. (Homeless person, male, 50)
I think that enforcement-based tactics are the
last resort, but when you see somebody killing
themselves, you know . How often does it
happen that somebody who is so on the gear
[drugs] that they end up on the street and they
are just begging and they’re falling apart .
come out of it without enforcement support?
I’ve seen [name of client], right, he didn’t even
want to talk to anybody, and he got put in
prison . He came out: ‘House me’. And to
this day he’s not using . I think that some-
times people need the control to be taken away
from them in order to change . (Frontline
practitioner, homelessness charity)
I find that when disruption has teeth, that
works really well . I remember a very long-
term drinking school . that was too big for
us to engage with. It was just not safe to
approach; it was counterproductive. So it was
purely an enforcement target . And people
did disperse into . smaller drinking schools
around the area, but that was much more man-
ageable for us, and made it easier to help people.
(Frontline practitioner, homelessness charity)
Equally, though, a number of stakeholders,
including both service providers and
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homeless people, opposed enforcement on
paternalist grounds, contending that these
interventions undermined – rather than
served – the best interests of those targeted.
Positive outcomes, such as the acceptance of
accommodation or desistence from aggres-
sive begging, were argued to be far from
guaranteed, whilst the potential penalties
(which might include lengthy prison sen-
tences) could be severe:
I know that the polarised argument always
goes along the lines that, for some people, a
more persuasive approach to move on with
sanctions works and, for those it works for, it
works very well but, for those it doesn’t work
for, it’s an absolute disaster. (Senior represen-
tative, campaigning organisation)
Opponents of enforcement offered many
examples of when enforcement had ‘dis-
placed’ vulnerable homeless people into loca-
tions or activities where they were at (even)
greater risk of harm, or where it was harder
for outreach support services to locate them:
Obviously when you’re on the street . you’re
going to congregate; safety in numbers and
things like that . Sometimes the police come
and tell you you have to move or you’re nicked.
But why do we have to move?. Especially as a
woman being on the street you feel safer, obvi-
ously, when you’re with people that you know.
(Homeless person, female, 43)
It hasn’t affected their drinking, but it makes
them . less likely to trust us as workers.
Because they’ve been moved on from a differ-
ent area, so it’s harder for us to. engage with
them. (Frontline practitioner, homelessness
charity)
Utilitarianism
‘Utilitarianism’ is an influential form of
moral philosophy focused on the maximisa-
tion of human ‘utility’ or ‘welfare’ – ‘the
greatest happiness of the greatest number’ in
Jeremy Bentham’s famous formulation. In
modern political philosophy, ‘utility’ is often
defined not as a psychic state of mind (happi-
ness) but as (informed) preference-satisfaction
(Goodin, 1993). In contrast to paternalism’s
exclusive concern with the best interests of those
targeted, the utilitarian lens widens the focus to
encompass the overall impact of enforcement
on the whole of society.
Proponents of enforcement often dep-
loyed a utilitarian rationale, emphasising the
negative impacts of rough sleeping, begging
and street drinking on the wider public. As
the extracts from local policy statements
below illustrate, the economic damage to
local business and tourism, the potential links
between street culture and criminal activity,
and/or evidence that these activities are inti-
midating to passers-by are often cited:
Extensive local consultation. provided indis-
putable evidence that large ‘street drinking
groups or schools’ . ‘turns off’ public spaces
for wider public use, causing areas to further
deteriorate and act as a catalyst for more seri-
ous criminal activity . Both street drinking
and begging have a negative impact on the
City and its otherwise positive image .
(Brighton and Hove Council, 2004: 5)
We acknowledge that when someone is in a
position where they feel they have no choice
but to sleep rough then it is likely something
has gone wrong in their lives . However, the
disruption and problems to local residents is
not reasonable and is unacceptable. Where
there is a build-up of rough sleepers we know
that there often follows a deterioration of
acceptable behaviour in that location. Waste
and detritus may start to be left on the street.
(Westminster City Council, 2013: 16)
Homeless people themselves also sometimes
drew on utilitarian principles in explaining
their support for the use of enforcement
when an individual causes demonstrable
harm to the local community:
There are people that [are] homeless that leave
syringes or what-not lying about. I actually
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don’t blame people for being angry at that. I
would want somebody moved if I was living
somewhere and they were urinating or what-
ever. (Homeless person, male, 48)
[Enforcement is] not just for their good, it’s
for the good of the community, isn’t it?. It isn’t
great for the night-time economy having lots of
beggars and rough sleepers around. If, every time
you go to a cash-point, someone’s going to ask
you for money, it puts you off going to that cash-
point, doesn’t it. (Homeless person, male, 34)
As with paternalism, however, utilitarian
stances were also evident in some stake-
holders’ opposition to, or at least reserva-
tions about, enforcement. Specifically, some
interviewees took the view that it was hard
to justify enforcement responses that maxi-
mised the interests of already privileged
members of society (home owners and busi-
ness proprietors) over the welfare of an
already extremely disadvantaged group,
especially if the ‘disutility’ being visited upon
the wider community was deemed trivial:
There’s this mentality of homeless people,
street drinkers, people who loiter, as being
unsightly, and I think they just offend people’s
aesthetics, and that’s why members of the
community complain and services get
involved. And in order for the police to deliver
outcomes, to show the community that they’re
doing something, they just move the problem .
(Frontline practitioner, homelessness charity)
Rights
Commentators who are most vociferous in
their opposition to enforcement often
employ the language of ‘rights’. Individual
rights can be thought of as ‘side constraints’
(Dworkin, 1977) that place an ethical limit
on the pursuit (e.g. through public policies)
of the collective good (Kymlicka, 2002), and
so stand in opposition to ‘utility maximising’
moral codes. Rights-based perspectives span
the political spectrum from those primarily
concerned with the right to ‘freedom from’
state interference, to those focused on posi-
tive entitlements to social and welfare goods
(Fitzpatrick et al., 2014; King, 2003).
A number of stakeholders working in the
homelessness sector saw enforcement as con-
travening people’s ‘right’ to sleep rough,
drink on the street, or acquire money via
begging, even if it harmed them, and
objected to what they saw as the inappropri-
ate imposition of (middle-class) values on
street homeless people:
There’s something of the free-born Englishman
that you see in homeless people . who live
lives on their own terms and don’t necessarily
want to conform . Sometimes those philoso-
phical choices, while they might be in opposi-
tion to the norms, they are our prophets, they
are our poets . For some people it’s what
they’re used to, it’s a survivalist kind of life .
(Senior representative, umbrella organisation)
[Street drinking] is his choice of lifestyle.
That’s not for us to make a judgement call on.
(Frontline practitioner, homelessness charity)
A lot of people who are begging don’t claim
benefits . Okay, its tax free and all the other
things, but it’s their job, and who would want
to sit on the street in the weather we’ve had
basically, and beg? I wouldn’t. But it is the
individual’s choice . I think they’re making
an honest living . they’re not shoplifting,
they’re not pick-pocketing. (Frontline practi-
tioner, homelessness charity)
However, this rights-based moral reasoning
was seldom invoked by homeless people
themselves in their consideration of the ethics
of enforcement. It was also called into ques-
tion by key informants and practitioners who
pointed out that the very idea of ‘choice’ or
‘free will’ can be a mirage in circumstances
where addictions or other issues severely
impair individuals’ cognitive capacity to com-
prehend the consequences of their actions:
For a lot of people that are caught up in a
street lifestyle . that have mental health
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issues or addictions that really mean there’s a
question mark over their capacity to make
appropriate choices about their future .
Actually the system needs to be ambitious for
them until they’re able to be ambitious for
themselves again . I think if I can be con-
vinced that somebody, in a very lucid and
informed way, has made a conscious choice to
live a particular lifestyle I think I can respect
that. But the vast majority of people that I’ve
worked with over the years are not in that
category. (Senior representative, voluntary
sector organisation)
Capacity around addictive behaviour is a
really grey, sketchy area. Essentially [if allow-
ing a street drinker to continue drinking in
public places] we’d be complicit in allowing,
potentially, people that we’re meant to have
some responsibility for to continue to engage
in behaviour that they may not actually be
able to control. I mean, that’s addiction, isn’t
it? Loss of control. To the point of death. So
you need to find a balance. (Frontline practi-
tioner, homelessness charity)
Contractualism
‘Contractualism’ imagines the relationship
between the citizen and the state as based on
reciprocal obligations, seeing the state as
obliged to furnish citizens with certain kinds
of assistance and the beneficiaries, in return,
obliged to ‘give something back’ (Paz-
Fuchs, 2008). As Deacon (2004: 915) pithily
puts it: ‘If the government keeps its part of
the bargain, then the claimants should keep
theirs.’ The emphasis in these contractualist
accounts tends to be on citizens’ responsibil-
ities rather than on their rights, and for
street homeless people this generally pertains
to their having a moral obligation to accept
the (tax-payer funded) help on offer.
Contractualist principles were clearly evi-
dent in many national and local policy docu-
ments endorsing enforcement. The following
examples are illustrative:
There are places for rough sleepers to sleep at
night; there is support and treatment available
for their health needs. and there are benefits
available to pay for their food and rent. The
reality is that the majority of people who beg
are doing so to sustain a drug habit, and are
often caught up in much more serious crime.
(Home Office, 2003: 47)
We will align our services to ensure there is an
effective and resolute response to rough sleep-
ing hotspot locations in Westminster. We will
continue to commission services to ensure that
everyone has a route off the streets. People
who are sleeping rough will, quite simply, not
have a good reason to be there. (Westminster
City Council, 2013: 16)
Contractualist forms of reasoning were also
prominent in the opposition to enforcement.
Service providers and campaigning bodies in
particular saw the use of force as illegitimate
when the support ‘offer’ was inadequate.
From this perspective, homeless people
should not be penalised for failing to move
into accommodation and/or engage with
substance misuse treatment programmes if
these are inaccessible or of poor quality:
It’s not good enough to say that they have all
the services available and so the next step must
be to penalise and criminalise them. Our start-
ing point is, well, what are the services? Have
they been effective? Are we dealing with people
who are service resistant or dealing with ser-
vices that are ineffective? (Senior representa-
tive, campaigning organisation)
There’s a chronic shortage of temporary
accommodation in [name of city] . When
somebody’s on the phone at 11pm and there
just is physically not the bed to put them in.
That has a big impact on us finding the route
off the street for a lot of people. (Senior repre-
sentative, homelessness charity)
Likewise, the difficulties that homeless inter-
viewees reported in accessing temporary
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accommodation and their fears about using
it based on previous experiences, indicated
that it could not be assumed that the
Government’s side of any imagined ‘bar-
gain’ was in fact being honoured:
I’ve been visiting a hostel that I was referred
to every day for the past seven or eight days.
And they told me there’s no vacancy . But
there are those who are trying to get back up
and finding it really difficult, so when you
have this threat of arresting them, it’s not fair.
(Homeless person, male, 43)
These people [outreach team] sent me to . a
hostel but the conditions there were terrible
and I was better off sleeping outside. When I saw
it I was there for ten minutes and it was disgusting
. I left. (Homeless person, male, 31)
Mutualism
According to the ‘mutualist’ normative per-
spective, people have responsibilities towards
each other that arise independently of any
claims that they may make on the state
(Etzioni, 1998; Kymlicka, 2002). These
moral obligations are said to be rooted in
principles of mutual respect and concern for
others simply as fellow human beings
(Selznick, 1998: 63). There are Marxist forms
(Dwyer, 2010), but as a moral code mutual-
ism is often associated with nostalgia for tra-
ditional (conservative) values and sources of
authority, such as the family, community
and church (Phillips, 1993).
One specific strand of mutualism that
appears to have strong popular appeal in the
UK (O’Neil et al., 2017) relates to theologi-
cal principles that stress human interdepen-
dence and moral obligations to care for the
‘needy other’ (Johnsen, 2014). Drawing
explicitly on this perspective, a number of
faith-based service providers opposed
enforcement on the grounds that it compro-
mised society’s ability to care for homeless
people in a manner consistent with their
innate dignity and worth:
I think our stance philosophically and theolo-
gically, would be that . we have to care for
each other as an obligation that we have as
human beings . If someone is in need that’s
my problem as a Christian, as a member of
society . We’re all interdependent, we’re all
needy . That mutuality requires a response,
but it’s that person’s own choice, it’s not
forced on them . (Senior representative,
umbrella organisation)
On the other hand, some interviewees sup-
ported enforcement on the mutualist ground
that, as a fellow human being, they simply
could not ‘walk on by’ whilst someone lived
such a harmful lifestyle (see also the patern-
alist discussion above):
There will be those who will say that they’re
making a lifestyle choice and that by urging
them to move inside we are misguidedly foist-
ing our values on them . [But] I recall once
trying to explain the doctrine of lifestyle choice
to the children of a rough sleeper at his fun-
eral. They listened politely, but I could guess
what they were thinking and that was that if it
had been your dad sleeping in that shop door-
way, a greater humanity would have trumped
your belief in lifestyle choice. (Senior represen-
tative, homelessness charity)
A very different twist on mutualist support
for enforcement is offered by those who take
the view that community standards to
refrain from anti-social behaviour apply no
matter how desperate one’s situation. The
following comment made by a local council-
lor regarding the conduct of a group of
rough sleepers within his jurisdiction is a
pertinent example:
It’s tragic that in this day and age, and in a
country like the UK, we still have vulnerable
people living rough. However, my sympathy
for rough sleepers ends when their behaviour
results in people feeling intimidated and
unsafe. The people living at Montague Road
car park used it like a public toilet. There is
absolutely no excuse for people to behave like
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animals – whatever their circumstances.
(Foote, cited in Cumber, 2016)
Social justice
The idea of ‘social justice’ pertains to funda-
mental questions regarding the distribution
of society’s benefits and burdens, that is,
‘who should get what and why?’ Theories
of social justice are diverse and employ a
range of criteria in promoting a moral basis
for the distribution of society’s valued
goods, including need, desert and equality
(Johnston, 2011; Sen, 1992). Most social jus-
tice theorists emphasise the achievement of
relevant distributive outcomes, though some
also focus on the independent value of pro-
cedural justice (Miller, 1999).
As noted above when discussing paternal-
ism, a range of stakeholders endorsed the
use of force in street homelessness policies as
a means to address the ‘needs’ of those tar-
geted, especially when that need was so
extreme as to be life-threatening. These sorts
of arguments can also be interpreted as
offering a social justice-orientated defence of
force, if it can be shown that enforcement
interventions do in fact protect the welfare
of street homeless people. This is an empiri-
cal question to which we return later.
But social justice-style reasoning was more
often used to oppose enforcement, including
by those whose social justice-related reason-
ing foregrounded issues of ‘desert’, and spe-
cifically the idea that enforcement unfairly
penalises people for behaviour caused by fac-
tors largely outwith their control:
I don’t think it’s fair [to arrest rough sleepers]
because it’s not necessarily a person’s fault
that they’ve ended up that way . I’ve got
issues that I’ve dealt with that have just taken
me down a certain road, which has been alco-
holism. It’s led me to – through alcoholism –
sleep rough. I was brought up in care, I was
sexually abused . It wasn’t an aspiration for
me to be an alcoholic at school, you know,
but I am. (Homeless person, male, 34)
These narratives resonate strongly with evi-
dence demonstrating the prevalence of com-
plex trauma and poverty, often dating back
to childhood, amongst the homeless popula-
tion (see, for example, Bramley and
Fitzpatrick, 2018; Fitzpatrick et al., 2013).
Also, chiming with the social justice litera-
ture’s focus on ‘equality of treatment’, ser-
vice providers and homeless people alike saw
the discriminatory manner in which some
enforcement powers are applied as unjust:
I see . business people sitting with bottles of
wine, bottles of champagne, cans of beer, now
they never got asked to move. But the alco-
holics that were sitting with bottles of
Lambrini, bottles of cider, not shouting and
that, they were asked to move. Now what’s
the difference really? . I believe everyone is
equal. Sometimes in the police’s eyes some are
less than others, which I don’t agree with.
(Homeless person, male, 34)
Discussion
The deployment of force in response to rough
sleeping, begging and street drinking is a sensi-
tive issue that tends to evoke highly emotive
responses. Drawing upon detailed empirical
work conducted in the UK, this paper has
mapped the views of stakeholders with a
range of viewpoints, including some (most
notably homeless people) who have received
little research attention to date. In so doing, it
has highlighted a disparity between the pejora-
tive rhetoric that is predominant in much aca-
demic and media discourse, and a far messier
picture of competing intuitions, conflicting
priorities and complex moral reasoning ‘on
the ground’.
Stakeholders argued both for and against
enforcement on multiple, sometimes overlap-
ping, sometimes opposing, normative
grounds. Paternalist reasoning is deployed to
make a case for enforcement if it is believed
that it can genuinely benefit those it targets,
whereas utilitarianism broadens the focus to
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enable the sum of benefits and losses to those
targeted and other users of public space to be
taken into account. The kind of rights-based
reasoning employed by some stakeholders is
less concerned with the consequences of
enforcement, but rather emphasises its poten-
tially illegitimate violation of people’s freedom
to live the lifestyles they wish to. The contrac-
tualist repertoire is used to defend enforcement
where stakeholders see the state meeting its
‘side of the bargain’ in providing adequate
support and accommodation options, but to
oppose enforcement where this condition is
not met. Mutualist arguments are sometimes
used to justify enforcement even where such
support and accommodation is not available,
on the basis of community standards to refrain
from anti-social behaviour that are taken to
apply no matter one’s circumstances. But
equally they are also used to oppose enforce-
ment on the grounds that it compromises
society’s ability to care for homeless people in
a manner consistent with the dignity and
innate worth of all human beings. Social justice
repertoires are evident in the reasoning of
those who see enforcement as unjustly punish-
ing street homeless people for things outside
their control or discriminating against them by
treating them differently from other members
of society who engage in similar activities.
This normative mapping approach is use-
ful in highlighting that all those engaged in
debates about enforcement are deploying
moral arguments of some kind, drawing on
some (or multiple) sort(s) of ethical reason-
ing. It is not that there are ‘moral’ and ‘non-
moral’ positions in this debate, or that there
is, for instance, a neat split – as is sometimes
implied – between (conservative, self-regard-
ing) urban authorities on the one hand and
(progressive, compassionate) service provi-
ders and campaigning bodies on the other.
Rather there are a wide range of ethical
tools ‘in play’ and none emerges as domi-
nant, albeit that some clearly have particular
traction in some contexts (e.g. contractual-
ism within the political lexicon of ‘rights and
responsibilities’ (Watts and Fitzpatrick,
2018)) or for specific groups (e.g. mutualism’s
resonance for those with a faith-orientation
and many other members of the UK public
(O’Neil et al., 2017)). This is complex terri-
tory, but it is nonetheless possible to identify,
explore and compare these normative frame-
works and to consider their defensibility.
Charting these normative perspectives is
also useful in revealing that people can dis-
agree in three quite distinct ways, which
should not be conflated. First, they can
reach opposing conclusions because they are
drawing on different normative frameworks
in their ethical reasoning. This reflects that
both individuals (Graham et al., 2011) and
societies (Fitzpatrick and Stephens, 2014)
have different value systems, or at least bal-
ance and prioritise distinct ethical principles,
commitments and forms of reasoning differ-
ently. Someone with a strong paternalistic
inclination, for instance, might advocate
enforcement measures if they believe these
approaches benefit those targeted, but be
unable to convince someone whose overrid-
ing concern is people’s right to choose how
they live of the same conclusion, even if they
concede the paternalist’s claim.
Second, people may ultimately endorse
the same substantive conclusion (that
enforcement is morally required, justified or
deeply reprehensible) but do so by employ-
ing entirely distinct forms of normative rea-
soning. Given certain conditions (see below),
for example, those swayed by utilitarian,
paternalist and social justice frameworks
may all be of the view that enforcement is
ethically highly problematic. Here, disagree-
ment concerns the kinds of moral reasoning
and intuitions seen to be compelling, even
though there is agreement on the kinds of
policy that should (or should not) be
pursued.
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Third, people can disagree even if they
hold most sympathy with the same norma-
tive lens: that is, they may employ the same
style of ethical reasoning, but reach opposite
conclusions. Two individuals with strongly
utilitarian intuitions, for instance, who see
the legitimacy of enforcement as entirely
dependent on the consequences it leads to,
may reach different final verdicts – depend-
ing on their experience or the evidence avail-
able to them – on whether it maximises
overall wellbeing, or not.
That there are multiple normative frames
of reference and multiple ways of disagree-
ing, may seem like a bleak conclusion that
leaves little hope of reaching ‘a common
point of view’ (Blackburn, 2001: 110) on the
ethical legitimacy of enforcement. But such
pessimism is not warranted. To begin with,
and as the possibility of sharing a normative
perspective but reaching distinct conclusions
highlights, there is very often a central
empirical dimension to these normative
questions. What in fact are the outcomes
associated with enforcement-based responses
to street homelessness? Are those on the
streets really making genuine ‘lifestyle’
choices? Are they seriously affecting the
wellbeing of others? If those engaged in
these debates accept the status of empirical
evidence and the rules of rational argument,
having clear answers to these questions nar-
rows the range and clarifies the terms of
ethical dispute.
Crucially, empirical evidence provides a
means of assessing how convincing particu-
lar justifications or critiques of enforcement
are on their own terms by arbitrating on the
accuracy of their underpinning assumptions.
For the paternalists’ viewpoint to be
respected, for instance, they must acknowl-
edge the weight of evidence demonstrating
whether, when and to what extent enforce-
ment serves the interests of those it targets
(or not). The rights-advocate similarly must
show willing to respond to compelling evi-
dence that street homelessness is not best
understood as a non-conformist lifestyle
choice (see Parsell, 2018). On this subject, it
must be noted that research evidence regard-
ing the outcomes of different forms of social
control in homelessness interventions –
including some of those most widely employed
internationally – remains extremely limited4
(Johnsen et al., 2018; Mackie et al., 2017).
Furthermore, whilst some commentators
appear to be resolutely in favour of or opposed
to enforcement, the greater majority of stake-
holders interviewed articulated their positions
in ambivalent or irresolute terms. Many
described feeling ‘torn’ on the issue given the
vulnerability of those affected, the unpredict-
ability of outcomes, and the level of risk associ-
ated with both the use and non-use, of
enforcement (see also Watts et al., 2018).
These quandaries are well illustrated in the fol-
lowing comments made by a street outreach
worker and rough sleeper, respectively:
I think it is a fine balance between giving peo-
ple the freedoms that they are entitled to and
neglecting them. It’s not completely clear to
me, even, when one ends and the other one
starts, you know? (Frontline practitioner,
homelessness charity)
I have seen people on the streets that I really
think are not going to survive and I’d like to
grab hold of them and stick them in a hostel
or an A&E [Accident and Emergency] centre
but I respect them because they say they don’t
need help and they do need help. It’s very
hard. It’s a very thin line. (Homeless person,
male, 50)
These thoughtful reflections on the ethical
dilemmas and complex judgements involved
in deciding whether or not enforcement is
ethically permissible, or even required, stand
in stark contrast to the rhetorical hyperbole
deployed in many academic and media com-
mentaries in this field.
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Conclusion
This paper set out to explore the normative
perspectives of homeless people, frontline
practitioners and other key stakeholders on
enforcement measures targeting rough sleep-
ing and other forms of ‘problematic street
culture’ in the UK. Drawing on the ‘value
pluralist’ philosophical tradition, in-depth
qualitative research was conducted in six
UK cities on the forms of moral reasoning
drawn upon by these stakeholders in consid-
ering the ethics of enforcement. This illumi-
nated six key normative lenses that shaped
both opposition to and support for enforce-
ment measures on street homelessness:
paternalist, utilitarian, rights-based, contrac-
tualist, mutualist and social justice
perspectives.
Whilst the paper explored the complex
and divergent forms of ethical reasoning
employed by these key stakeholders in this
field, it has argued that there are three dis-
tinct reasons for optimism regarding the
possibility of progress towards some – albeit
always contingent and evolving – common
moral point of view on these sensitive issues.
First, it is evident that people deploying dif-
ferent forms of normative reasoning can
nevertheless reach the same conclusion on
the ethical legitimacy of enforcement, offer-
ing the possibility of robust policy consensus
even when stakeholders are working from
quite distinct moral foundations. Second,
the current enforcement debate is charac-
terised not by two opposing and resolute
camps, but by multiple stakeholders holding
often ambivalent views and ready to
acknowledge the important moral dilemmas
associated with this policy question. Third,
the possibility of more and better empirical
evidence on the impacts of enforcement in
practice offers a means to reach a broader
consensus, albeit that distinct foundational
ethical commitments may sometimes leave
stakeholders with irreconcilable views.
Whilst highlighting the diversity of nor-
mative reasoning in play, the analysis pre-
sented reveals a tentative degree of
consensus amongst a range of stakeholders
in the UK’s homelessness sector on some
aspects of the question of enforcement’s
legitimacy. In particular, many stakeholders
agree that force can be justified when the
activities of a member of the street popula-
tion are having a clear negative impact on
those around them (e.g. if they beg aggres-
sively), albeit that there is less agreement on
the question of whether it should be used
when they are ‘only’ harming themselves
(see also Johnsen et al., 2018; Sanders and
Albanese, 2017). Homeless people, too,
almost unanimously approve of enforcement
when it is used to protect the public (includ-
ing members of the street population) from
harmful anti-social behaviour, but simulta-
neously express concern about possible risks
to those targeted (on social justice grounds),
discriminatory implementation (mutualistic
grounds) or inadequacies in existing service
provision (contractualistic grounds).
By transparently acknowledging the dif-
ferent perspectives of a wide range of stake-
holders, the normative framework presented
can be used to highlight areas of consensus,
as well as help those involved understand
one another’s perspectives, even if they find
some of them unpalatable. This may go
some way to reducing the heat generated by
these debates and provide a platform for
more constructive conversation about policy
responses which take due account of the wel-
fare of all stakeholders in this and other
highly sensitive fields.
Finally, we would argue that preference
on the part of some urbanists for lofty rheto-
ric over serious engagement with the realities
of enforcement on the ground, and ignor-
ance or dismissal of the plurality of sincerely
held views on the ethics of such interven-
tions – arguably evident in the more emotive
contributions to the revanchist literature –
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undermine the credibility of academic
contributions to associated debate. More
seriously, where evident in mainstream
media, such rhetoric risks cheapening dis-
course on these highly complex and sensitive
matters (Tosi and Warmke, 2016) and
hindering constructive policy solutions. The
rhetoric on this subject needs rebalancing
and we would venture that the normative
analysis put forward here is a helpful aid to
that endeavour.
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Notes
1. Two notable exceptions are Stuart’s (2014)
ethnography involving police practices in Los
Angeles’ Skid Row and Sanders and
Albanese’s (2017) study involving a survey of
people with experience of rough sleeping.
2. The terms ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ are often used
interchangeably, but ‘moral’ can also be
understood to have a narrower meaning, con-
cerning how one ought to treat other people,
whereas ‘ethical’ can be understood more
broadly as encompassing ‘living a life well
lived’, including themes of self-improvement,
cultural enrichment and other ‘self-regarding’
issues in addition to other-regarding concerns.
3. See http://www.welfareconditionality.ac.uk/.
4. Housing First is a notable exception here.
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